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Actual vs. Apparent Influence:
Towards a Standard for
Lenders' CERCLA Liability
by Walter A. Effross
A s the 1990s began, twocircuits diverged overthe latest addition to the
arsenal of lender liabili-
ty: accountability for
environmental cleanup costs of bor-
rowers' spills. Though the Supreme
Court declined in January 1991 to
review this issue, three pending con-
gressional bills and a rule proposed
by the Environmental Protection
Agency seek to address conflicting
standards now in effect.
Paradoxically, lenders' potential
for environmental liability becomes
greater as they attempt to influence
borrowers' waste management poli-
cies. Thus, even after the EPA
addresses this increasingly trouble-
some area, lenders should reconsid-
er carefully the terms of any loans
secured by potential spill sites.
CERCLA LIABILITY
Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCIA),' strict liability is
imposed for environmental cleanup
costs over a wide range of actors and
circumstances. Not only can CER-
CIA damages be assessed for both
intentional disposals and accidental
spills of hazardous materials, claims
for such damages can be asserted
against "any person who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility
at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of.2
"Owner or operator" of an on-
shore facility is defined to include
current owners and operators, as
well as those who "owned, operated
or otherwise controlled activities at
the facility" immediately before title
to the facility was conveyed due to
state or local government by
bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delin-
quency or abandonment."
GROUNDS FOR LIABILITY
OF SECURED CREDITORS
"Alter ego" control over a sub-
sidiary may justify piercing the veil
and ascribing "operator" status to a
parent hiding behind a subsidiary
that is merely a "bogus shell."' A sig-
nificantly smaller degree of control,
however, suffices to subject a
secured creditor to CERCIA liability
for the spills of its borrower.
Under CERCIA, a secured credi-
tor may evade the liability of an
"owner or operator" by qualifying as
"a person who, without participating
in the management of a ... facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in
the ... facility."' Thus, the lender
who is cautious enough to hold
such "indicia of ownership" as mort-
gages on the borrower's facilities
must avoid "participating in the ir]
management."
As of August 1991, only the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits have elaborat-
ed or, the degree of participation that
will expose the lender to CERCLA
liability, and these two circuits dis-
agree.
DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
The first decision on this issue,
United States v. Mirabile," held that
for a secured creditor to be liable
under CERCIA "it must, at a mini-
mum, participate in the day-to-day
operational aspects of the site."7
Thus, the EPA was barred from
recovering its cleanup costs from a
mortgagee who had foreclosed on a
paint manufacturing plant subse-
quently designated a hazardous
waste site.
The court granted summary judg-
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ment to the mortgagee, which it saw
as foreclosing, not in order to own
the property, but to protect its securi-
ty interest in its collateral.' In this
context, the bank's securing the
property, exhibiting it to potential
buyers and investigating cleanup
costs were not "participation" in the
borrower's management but merely
efforts to protect the property from
further depreciation.!'
Mirabile also granted summary
judgment to a second lender whose
loan documents had anticipated actu-
al participation in management of the
facility. The court determined that
the lender's involvement was limited
to "purely financial aspects" of the
borrower's operations. This standard,
however, would not permit the court
to grant summary judgment to a third
lender which had one of its loan offi-
cers on the borrower's advisory
board and a second officer supervis-
ing the cash collateral accounts fol-
lowing the borrower's bankruptcy.
The next case to examine the
environmental liability of a secured
creditor under CERCLA seemed to
eliminate Mirabile's focus on the
degree of the creditor's involvement
in the borrower's management. In
United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co.,"' the district court denied
the bank's summary judgment
motion against EPA action to recover
cleanup costs. After foreclosing on its
interest in the real estate, the bank
acquired the property at a foreclo-
sure sale. It was unclear whether the
bank knew the property was contami-
nated; the borrower informed he
authorities of contamination one year
after the sale.
As strictly construed by the
court, however, CERC 1A's "owner
and operator" exemption did not
apply to the bank. At the time of
cleanup the bank had not held indi-
cia of ownership to protect its secu-
rity interest, but to protect its
investment held the land itself."
Thus, an exemption intended to pre-
clude CERCIA liability for secured
lenders in common law states, who
hold title to the property until their
loans are repaid, was inapplicable."-
Maryland Bank & Trust, however,
provided no guidance to lenders
anticipating foreclosing on contami-
nated properties and immediately
re-selling them.
THIRD CIRCUIT
PRECEDENT
Two district court decisions from
the Third Circuit support Mirabile's
day-to-day standard of participation.
In U.S. v. Nicolet Inc., " the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania declined to
impose liability on a mortgagee that
did not appear to have participated in
the "managerial and operational
aspects"" of an asbestos-contaminat-
ed facility. Four months later, in
Giudice v. BFG Electroplating and
Manufacturing Co.. Inc. 11 the
"... the most prudent
course for a secured
creditor is neither to
acquire nor exert control
over a borrower's
management ofa facility
which has real or potential
CERCLA liability." 8
Western District of Pennsylvania
held that a secured lender seeking to
protect its interest in a contaminated
facility following a loan default was
not an "owner or operator" of the
facility before it bought the property
at a foreclosure sale. Meeting with
the borrower's managers, reviewing
the borrower's accounts, personnel
and inventory, assisting the borrower
in its application for a small business
administration loan, inspecting the
property, referring a potential lessee
to the borrowers, and arranging
financing for the foreclosure sale of
the property did not evidence the
secured creditor's control over the
borrower's operations. production or
waste management.''
Giudice also agreed, howev-r
with Maryland Bank & Trust in
exposing the secured lender to clean-
up liability during the 18-month peri-
od between the lender's acquiring
title to the property and conveying
title to a third party.1 Noting that the
1986 amendments to CERCIA had
excluded from "owner and operator"
liability, local and state governments
that involuntarily acquire title to
property, the court inferred that, in
the absence of an analogous exemp-
tion, Congress intended to continue
cleanup liability for lenders obtaining
propeilies through foreclosure. ',
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
INTERFERENCE OF
CONTROL
In United States v'. Fleet Factors
Corp.,'' defendant made an agree-
ment to advance funds to a cloth
printing facility against an assign-
ment of the facility's accounts receiv-
able. Fleet had taken as collateral a
security interest in the facility and in
its equipment, inventory and fixtures.
After Fleet foreclosed and an auction
of the debtor's property was held, the
EPA found hundreds of drums of
toxic chemicals at the site, as well as
44 truckloads of asbestos-containing
material. The government sought to
recover the $400,000 of cleanup costs
from Fleet which held a deed of trust
to protect its security interest in the
facility.
The Eleventh Circuit declined to
adopt the federal government's inter-
pretation of CERCIA: that the terms
of the exemption from liability be
read literally to expose to CERCIA
liability a secured creditor with any
participation in the borrower's man-
agement. If the court found this inter-
pretation too harsh on lenders
"engaging in their normal course of
business,"2 ' it also rejected, as "too
permissive towards secured credi-
tors who are involved with toxic
waste facilities, the borrower's
Mirabile-type proposal, that only
lenders who participate in the day-to-
lay management of the facility could
be held liable.
Instead, Fleet Factors enunciated a
new standard for imposing cleanup
costs on the facility's secured creditor
without finding them to be "opera-
tors." The court would assess cleanup
costs against those creditors who had
a sufficiently broad involvement with
the debtor's management to support
the inference that they could, if they
chose, affect the borrower's haz-
ardous waste disposal decisions.-'
It remains unclear what degree of
involvement with the borrower's
management of a facility will be suffi-
cient to support the Fleet Factors
inference that the secured creditor
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could influence the borrower's dis-
posal of waste. The Eleventh Circuit,
however, noted that such control
would "[glenerally ... be inferred
from the extent of the creditor's
involvement in the facility's financial
management."2 3 (Given the evidence
that Fleet had actively controlled the
facility's disposal of hazardous
wastes, the inference of control had
been unnecessary in its case.)
The court envisioned that,
because potential creditors face the
possibility of being held liable
After its default on the leases and
a failed workout agreement, but not
before Oregon environmental author-
ities discovered contamination at the
facility, Bergsoe was put in involun-
tary bankruptcy under Chapter 11.
The Ninth Circuit, evaluating the
claims against the Port for cleanup
costs, first determined that the Port
held "indicia of ownership" - the
deed to the plant - merely to protect
its security interest in the property.
Then it addressed the thornier ques-
tion of whether the Port had "partici-
"As of December 1990,36 CERCLA suits had
been brought against lenders, and the EPA had notified 60
lenders of their potential liability for cleanup costs.'92
under CERCLA, they would evalu-
ate the waste treatment systems of
a potential debtor in arriving at the
terms of the loan agreement. Since
spills would threaten both the credi-
tor's finances and the debtor's
future loan arrangements, both bor-
rower and lender will be compelled
to comply with relevant environ-
mental regulations. In particular, a
secured creditor with a level of
involvement in the debtor's facility
sufficient to "anticipate losing its
exemption from CERCIA liability . .
. will have a strong incentive to
address hazardous waste problems
at the facility rather than studiously
avoiding the investigation and ame-
lioration of the hazard.""
NINTH CIRCUIT ACTUAL
DAILY MANAGEMENT
In In re Bergsoe Metal
Corporation,2 the Ninth Circuit
moved away from the Fleet Factors
"inference of influence" standard
towards the "day-to-day participation"
test. The Bergsoe lender, the Port of
St. Helens, was a municipal corpora-
tion authorized to issue revenue
bonds to promote industrial develop-
ment in that area of Oregon. Under a
sale-and-lease-back arrangement, the
Port was to hold the title to the lead
recycling plant under construction by
Bergsoe until Bergsoe made all
required rental payments to the bank
holding the revenue bonds.
pated in the management" of the
facility, noting that Fleet Factors
offered the only other circuit court
guidance on this topic.
Though it stopped short of
espousing an explicit rule defining
"participation in management," the
court held that the secured creditor
must engage in "some actual manage-
ment of the facility" before it could
be held liable as an owner or opera-
tor." Since it could not find that the
Port had exercised such control, the
court declined to "engage in line
drawing."27
The court was not impressed with
the argument that by extending its
loan the creditor had "negotiated and
encouraged" the building of the facil-
ity. Secured creditors always con-
tribute planning of large-scale pro-
jects, and necessarily "encourage"
those that they finance." Similarly,
the court would not infer manage-
ment of the facility from the lender's
retention of the rights to inspect the
premises and to re-enter and take
possession upon foreclosure: almost
all secured creditors reserve such
rights.1
The Bergsoe court concluded,
"Merely having the power to get
involved in management, but not
exercising it, is not enough" to con-
stitute participation within the mean-
ing of CERCLA. "A creditor must, as
a threshold matter, exercise actual
management authority before it can
be held liable for action or inaction
which results in the discharge of haz-
ardous wastes.""
CERTIORARI DENIED
In January 1991 the Supreme
Court denied Fleet Factors' petition
for writ of certiorari, thus declining
to review the disagreement between
the Fleet Factors decision in the
Eleventh Circuit and the Bergsoe
decision in the Ninth Circuit. In its
brief against certiorari, the
Department of Justice contended
that the case was not ripe for review,
as the factual issue of the secured
creditor's participation in manage-
ment had been remanded to the trial
court. Further, the government
asserted that it had only pursued
those lenders who had extensively
participated in offending borrowers'
managements.:" The brief submitted
by a coalition of banking institutions,
however, indicated that the problem
of lenders' cleanup liability would not
be resolved soon. As of December
1990, 36 CERCLA suits had been
brought against lenders, and the
EPA had notified 60 lenders of their
potential liability for cleanup costs.32
CONGRESSIONAL
SOLUTIONS
As of August 1991, Congress is
considering three bills which
address the CERC[A liability of
secured lenders. The "participation"
standard of H.R. 1450 goes beyond
even Mirabile's "day-to-day" test, and
could more accurately be character-
ized as a "super-Mirabile" test. This
bill would re-define "participation"
under CERCLA to apply to those situ-
ations in which the secured creditor,
through "the actual, direct and con-
tinual or recurrent exercise of man-
agerial control" of the facility or ves-
sel, "materially divests" the borrower
of control.
A secured creditor's foreclosing
on the property, or aiding the bor-
rower's winding-down operations,
would not constitute participation.
Similarly, a creditor that had fore-
closed on the facility would escape
''owner or operator" liability under
CERCIA so long as the creditor dili-
gently attempted to sell the property
on reasonable terms as quickly as
possible; that is, so long as the credi-
tor is attempting to protect the value
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of its security interest, rather than to
invest in the property.
Under H.R. 1463 lenders holding
indicia of ownership for the purpose
of securing repayment would not be
liable for cleanup costs for participat-
ing in management if they: 1) sold
collateral; 2) conducted certain envi-
ronmental audits; 3) while working
to pass title of the facility, responsi-
bly prevented hazardous spills; 4)
had the capacity to affect the facility's
waste management; or 5) engaged in
workout activities such as restructur-
ing or re-negotiation of a loan.
Introduced in the Senate, S.651
would revise the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811 et
seq., to exempt insured depository
institutions and mortgage lenders
from any law, including CERCIA,
that imposes strict liability for haz-
ardous discharges from property
acquired through foreclosure, held in
a fiduciary capacity, held by a lessor
pursuant to an extension of credit, or
subject to financial control pursuant
to the terms of an extension of credit.
Such exemptions, though, would
not apply to a secured lender that
caused the hazardous discharge,
actively directs or conducts opera-
tions that result in the discharge, or
knew about the hazardous conditions
but failed to take "all reasonable
actions necessary to prevent" the dis-
charge. Also any creditor that benefit-
ed from a cleanup action instituted by
the government or other party would
be liable for the value of such benefit
which could be no greater than the
fair market value of the property.
PROPOSED EPA RULE
On June 24, 1991, the EPA pub-
lished a proposed rule on this issue.3
Under this proposal, as under
Bergsoe, a secured creditor would not
be subject to CERCIA liability as the
operator of a facility in the borrow-
er's possession unless the creditor
has engaged in "actual participation
in the management or operational
affairs" of the borrower. Such partici-
pation is indicated where the secured
creditor has effectively assumed
responsibility for the borrower's poli-
cies, practices and procedures on
waste disposal and hazardous sub-
stance handling.
The secured creditor is not
exposed to CERCIA liability if it has
"the mere capacity, ability or unexer-
cised right to influence facility opera-
tions." Nor would it be considered
participation for the lender to con-
duct or require an environmental
inspection of the facility to ensure
that the borrower is complying with
the environmental statutes, to insist
that the borrower clean up the facili-
ty before or during the loan, or to
insert environmental warranties,
covenants, and representations into
loan and contract documents.
Under the EPA draft rule, the
lender may engage in "workout"
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activities, such as restructuring or
renegotiating a loan or providing spe-
cific financial or operational advice,
without participating in the borrow-
er's management, so long as the
workout is structured to protect and
preserve the lender's security inter-
est, and the lender allows the bor-
rower to maintain control over the
operations of the facility, particularly
wJ. respect to hazardous materials.
The SPA draft, however, reminds
secui-ed creditors that even if they
are not deemed to be participating in
Continued on page 42
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continued from page 41
management they may be indepen-
dently liable under such provisions of
CERC[A as those covering trans-
porters of, or contractors for the
transport of, hazardous substances."
The EPA rule would address
Maryland Bank & Trust Co.'s unre-
solved foreclosure issue by applying
the secured creditor exemption to
those situations in which the creditor
has foreclosed on a loan "primarily to
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
INDETERMINACY
Even under the EPA rule as pro-
posed, the CERCIA liability of a
secured creditor is far from clear.
The circumstances under which a
lender will be held liable as an
"owner or operator" for participating
in management can only be
described as fact-sensitive. Third par-
ties still are able to sue lenders for
recovery of cleanup costs."
Questions persist about the duty of
"On June 24, 1991, the EPA published
a proposed rule. . . , a secured creditor would
not qualhf for CERCIA liability as the operator of a
facility in the borrower's possession unless the creditor
has engaged in 'actual participation in the management
or operational affairs' of the borrower."
protect its security interest." The
secured creditor, while preventing
and minimizing the release of haz-
ardous materials, should wind up the
borrower's operations on the
acquired facility or take other appro-
priate action to ensure that the
secured asset's value is maximized.
(The creditor may not be liable for
spills that occur under these circum-
stances.)
The foreclosing creditor must
take reasonable steps to sell the
property. After six months from the
foreclosure date, the creditor cannot
ignore a written bona fide firm offer
of a value at least that of the borrow-
er's outstanding obligation. If the
creditor does not divest itself of the
property within a reasonable period,
it may lose the exemption. The EPA,
however, declines to suggest the
length of a reasonable period, noting
only that Maryland Bank and Trust
held four years was too long a period
while Mirabile found four months
acceptable.
The comment period on the EPA's
proposed rule expired on July 24,
1991. The proposal will now be pro-
mulgated and, if application is made
within 90 days, will be subject to
review by the U.S. Court of Appeals
the lender to address environmental
problems during the "workout"
stage. 6 Finally, the cost of uncertain-
ty and of increased environmental
monitoring has led to higher interest
rates and transaction costs, with
debatable effects for the banking
industry."
Until these and other issues are
resolved and their ramifications clari-
fied, the most prudent course for a
secured creditor is neither to acquire
nor exert control over a borrower's
management of a facility which has
real or potential CERCIA liability." If
loans to such borrowers are made,
the documents should explicitly min-
imize any control given to the lender
over the borrower's management
decisions, particularly in the environ-
mental context. If such control must
be provided for, it should not be
exercised by the lender.
In the spreading wake of Fleet
Factors and Bergsoe, secured lenders
may best protect themselves by
adjusting the terms of loans to reflect
the lenders' potential cleanup liabili-
ty. In addition, lenders may attempt
to substitute alternate security, such
as guarantees, for facilities of envi-
ronmental concern that currently col-
lateralize loans.
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